

## Message Text

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ACTION IO-06

INFO OCT-01 EA-06 ISO-00 AF-04 ARA-06 EUR-08 NEA-06 RSC-01

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-01 INR-05 L-01 NSAE-00 NSC-05

PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 OIC-02 CU-02 /082 W

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P R 260038Z OCT 74

FM USMISSION USUN NY

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6786

INFO AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

AMEMBASSY MANILA

AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USUN 4450

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: UN, PFOR, CB

SUBJ: KHMER IN 29TH GA: OUTLOOK AS OF OCT 25

SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE SEEKS TO APPRAISE CURRENT AND PROSPECTIVE SITUATION AND ATMOSPHERICS OF KHMER ISSUE, WHICH PLENARY SEEMS LIKELY TO TAKE UP DURING LAST HALF OF NOV. END SUMMARY.

1. WE DO NOT YET KNOW WHEN KHMER DEBATE WILL BEGIN IN PLENARY, BUT WE ARE STILL ANTICIPATING, ON BASIS OF WHAT HAS BEEN SAID BY THOSE CLOSER TO GA PRESIDENT BOUTEFILKA THAN WE, THAT IT WILL BE TAKEN UP ABOUT NOV 18. HOWEVER, IT MIGHT START AS LATE AS FIRST WEEK IN DEC.

2. ASEAN RESOLUTION WHICH WAS ISSUED AS UN DOCUMENT FIRST OF THIS WEEK REPRESENTS GKR SUPPORTERS' BASIC DECISION ON HOW BEST TO TRY TO DEFEAT PRO-GRUNK RESOLUTION: THEIR ENERGIES NOW ARE FOCUSED INTENSIVELY ON OBTAINING SUPPORT FOR THIS DRAFT, AND  
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QUESTIONS OF PARLIAMENTARY TACTICS, WHILE BEING CONSIDERED

IN LOW KEY, ARE FOR MOMENT NOT PRINCIPAL CONCERN. EFFORT NOW IS TO EXPLAIN AND SEEK SUPPORT FOR SUBSTANCE OF DRAFT, WITH SECONDARY EFFORT TO GAIN SUPPORT FOR GIVING IT PRIORITY OVER HOSTILE RESOLUTION. ALL GKR'S ALLIES HERE RECOGNIZE THAT VOTE ON PRIORITY WILL BE OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE, AND HOW TO OBTAIN COMMITMENTS FOR THAT VOTE IS A MAJOR TOPIC IN CONSULTATIONS HERE.

3. WE STILL ARE SHORT OF BEING ABLE TO PROJECT A MAJORITY VOTE EITHER FOR PRIORITY OR FOR SUBSTANCE. BUT, REPORTING FROM HERE AND FROM CAPITALS HAS REFLECTED APPARENT SYMPATHY WITH THE POSITION EMBODIED IN ASEAN DRAFT AND A NUMBER OF "COMMITMENTS" HAVE FLOWED FROM THIS. NEVERTHELESS, SUCH STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT--WHETHER THEY HAVE BEEN EXPLICIT ON BOTH PRIORITY AND SUBSTANCE OR HAVE MERELY BEEN GENERAL EXPRESSIONS--DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT HOW A GIVEN DELEGATION WILL PUSH THE BUTTONS WHEN THE ISSUE CLIMAXES.

4. AS OUR REPORTING OVER PAST WEEK INDICATES, FRIENDS OF GKR SEEM TO BE WORKING WELL TOGETHER. THIS REMAINS AN ASEAN-LED EFFORT, SUCCESS OF WHICH WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT VIGOROUS JAPANESE AND US SUPPORT. WE THIS YEAR ON THIS ISSUE ARE WITNESSING--AND BENEFITTING FROM--PROBABLY--UNPRECEDENTEDLY ENERGETIC AND INTEGRATED LOBBYING EFFORT BY ASEANS. FACT THAT US IS NOT AN ORIGINAL CO-SPONSOR AND THAT WE ARE TAKING CARE TO TREAD SOFTLY IN DEALING WITH ISSUE HERE MAY WELL BE THE SINE QUA NON OF CONTINUED ASEAN VIGOR AND SUCCESS.

5. AS OUR REPORTING ALSO REFLECTS, OFFICERS OF THIS MISSION ARE VERY ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN BILATERAL EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION WITH ASEANS, JAPANESE AND OTHERS. WE ARE ALSO MEETING REGULARLY AS PART OF THAI-CHAired STAFF LEVEL WORKING GROUP THAT INCLUDES MORE ACTIVE CO-SPONSORS AND OURSELVES. ASEAN SENSITIVITIES ABOUT US ROLE REMAIN VERY HIGH. WE HAVE LITTLE DOUBT THAT THEY WOULD PREFER TO DEFEAT PRO-SIHANOUK EFFORT WITHOUT EITHER JAPANESE OR US HELP. TENSIONS BETWEEN SOUTHEAST ASIANS AND JAPANESE ARE A CONSTANT FACTOR--IF NOT ALWAYS OBVIOUS--IN OUR GROUP PLANNING SESSIONS AND JAPANESE SPEAK WITH SOFT VOICE WITH ASEANS HERE (WHILE EARNING THEIR PLAUDITS FOR EFFECTIVE LOBBYING EFFORTS).  
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GKR AMB CHHUT SIMILARLY HAS EARNED CO-SPONSORS' RESPECT BY HIS ENERGY AND ASTUTENESS.

6. ASEANS RECOGNIZE IMPORTANCE OF US ROLE. THEY ARE IMPRESSED BY PERSONAL EFFORTS OF SECRETARY AND FEEL NEED FOR SKILLS, ENERGIES AND FACILITIES THAT US WORLDWIDE DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENT CAN PROVIDE. THEY ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT US POLICY INTERESTS REQUIRE ASEANS ACTION PERHAPS MORE THAN THEY NEED OURS.

THUS WE ARE CONTINUING TO EXERCISE CARE IN MANNER IN WHICH WE CONCERT WITH ASEANS HERE. THEY, PARTICULARLY THAI AMB (CHAIRMAN OF ASIAN WORKING GROUP) AND HIS DEPUTY (CHAIRMAN OF THE STAFF LEVEL COORDINATING TEAM), MAINTAIN POSTURE THAT WE ARE WORKING UNDER THEIR LEADERSHIP AND, TO SOME EXTENT, AT THEIR BEHEST. WE HAVE FOUND IT FEASIBLE--IF SOMETIMES PAINFUL-- TO OPERATE WITHIN STRICTURE THIS IMPLIES. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS POSTURE, INCLUDING ABSENCE OF OUR NAME ON CO-SPONSORS LIST, FREES ASEANS AND EVEN OTHERS TO LOBBY EFFECTIVELY TO A DEGREE THEY WOULD NOT OTHERWISE DO. WE HAVE DISCUSSED ALL THIS IN GREAT FRANKNESS WITH CHHUT CHHOEUR AND, SOMEWHAT MORE DELICATELY, WITH JAPANESE, AND WE BELIEVE THAT PRESENT INSITTUTIONAL FRAMEWORK IS A GOOD ONE TO GET THE JOB DONE.

7. PART OF THE REQUIREMENT UNDER THIS SYSTEM, HOWEVER, IS THAT BOTH USUN AND THE DEPARTMENT TAKE GREAT CARE TO AVOID, IN OUR WORK ON KHMER, APPROACHING THE ASEANS ON THIS ISSUE AS IF IT WERE A "US" ISSUE WHICH THEY ARE SUPPORTING. THUS WHEN THE DEPARTMENT BELIEVES IT ADVISABLE TO MAKE REQUESTS IN ASEAN CAPITALS FOR LOBBYING CERTAIN TARGETS, WE STRONGLY HOPE THAT WE CAN BE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE IT FIRST OR AT LEAST SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE INDIVIDUAL ASEAN DELEGATION CONCERNED OR WITH THE PLANNING GROUP HERE.

8. AS NOTED THE ASEAN DRAFT HAS RATHER QUICKLY RECEIVED WELCOME INDICATIONS OF SUPPORT, SOMEWHAT BEYOND WHAT WE AND OTHERS ANTICIPATED AT THIS STAGE. THERE ARE SIGNS THAT THE GRUNK SUPPORTERS MAY HAVE BEEN PUT SOMEWHAT OFF BALANCE BY BOTH THE NON-POLEMICAL AND SERIOUS CHARACTER OF THE RESOLUTION AND BY THE RELATIVE INVISIBILITY OF US. LOBBYING TACTICS. WE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF WE ENCOUNTERED, IN THE NEXT WEEK OR TWO, A MAJOR COUNTER-EFFORT  
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BY THE OTHER SIDE, HERE AND IN CAPITALS. HOSTILE COSPONSORS MAY WELL PLAY HEAVILY ON THEME THAT ANYTHING BUT OPPOSITION TO ASEAN DRAFT WOULD BE A VIOLATION OF "NON-ALIGNMENT" AND THUS A VOTE FOR PRIORITY OR FOR SUBSTANCE WOULD BE CONSIDERED HOSTILE. GRUNK COSPONSORS SUDDENLY MAY BECOME MORE ACTIVE IN CAPITALS; THE OPP-OSITION MAY TURN SIHANOUK ON (IF NOT TURN HIM LOOSE) FOR THIS PURPOSE.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6787

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USUN 4450

9. EVEN IF GRUNK SUPPORTERS DO NOT COUNTER WITH NEW LOBBYING, WE STILL HAVE FORMIDABLE TASK TO ENSURE THAT THE GRUNK IS NOT SEATED. GIVEN THE UNPREDICABILITY OF VOTING SITUATION ON SUCH ISSUES, AND THE PRESSURES THAT THE OTHER SIDE WILL BRING TO BEAR, AND APPARENT MAJORITY OF A FEW VOTES FOR PRIORITY AND SUBSTANCE A FORTNIGHT FROM NOW, EVEN IF WE HAVE MOVED THAT FAR, WILL BE FAR FROM COMFORTABLE, AND THE FRIENDLY GROUP WILL HAVE TO EXAMINE CONTINUOUSLY LOBBYING TACTICS FOR INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES, MONITOR THE ACTIVITIES OF THE OTHER SIDE, AND BE PREPARED TO RE-EXAMINE OVERALL STRATEGY.

10. IN DOING SO, WE WILL HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALSO THE IMPACT OF OTHER ISSUES ON THE KHMER QUESTION, SUCH AS SOUTH AFRICA, CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES, KOREA, PLO AND CYPRUS. WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT OUR LOBBYING ON ONE OR ANOTHER OF THESE ISSUES CAN VITIATE OUR--AND OUR ALLIES--EFFECTIVENESS ON KHMER AND THAT THE HOSTILE COSPONSORS WILL BE SEEKING, IF THEIR PLANNING IS DONE WITH THE CARE WE ASSUME, TO EXPLOIT THE

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ATMPSPHERE CREATED BY THESE ISSUES TO HEIGHTEN THE PRESSURE ON TARGET COUNTRIES. AS A RULE OF THUMB, WE MUST ANTICIPATE

THAT THE MORE HEATED THESE OTHER ISSUES BECOME THE MORE THEY  
WILL HURT US ON KHMER.

1. ON ANOTHER ASPECT OF ATMOSPHERICS, WHATEVER POSITIVE  
RESPONSES WE RECEIVE IN CAPITALS IN THE RECENT PAST OR NEAR  
FUTURE, THE ACTIONS OF DELEGATES HERE AT VOTING TIME CAN BE  
ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY ATTENTION GIVEN THE ISSUE IN THE LOCAL PRESS.  
TO DATE THE PRESS HAD GIVEN LITTLE ATTENTION TO KHMER. THIS  
HAS BEEN HELPFUL, PARTICULARLY SINCE WE JUDGE THAT WHEN SUCH AN  
ISSUE AS KHMER IS DRAMATIZED BY THE PRESS IT IS MORE LIKELY  
TO HEIGHTEN TARGET COUNTRIES' AND MISSIONS' SENSE OF BEING  
ON THE GRIDDLE, RENDERING THEM MORE VULNERABLE TO THE KIND  
OF PRESSURES THE NON-ALIGNED CAN APPLY. WITH THIS IN MIND,  
WE HAVE DELIBERATELY AVOIDED HIGHLIGHTING KHMER IN OUR PRESS CONTACTS  
AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. KHMER WILL GET MORE THAN ADEQUATE  
ATTENTION, WE ASSUME, AT LEAST BY THE TIME DEBATE GETS UNDER WAY.

12. AS DEPARTMENT AWARE, WE HAVE TWO PENDING KHMER CREDENTIALS  
ISSUES ON WHICH SO FAR WE HAVE ESCAPED DAMAGE: UNESCO AND  
CURRENT GA. IN BOTH INSTANCES, IT LOOKS NOW AS THOUGH WE CAN  
ESCAPE PREMATURE VOTES ON KHMER CREDENTIALS THAT COULD  
DAMAGE US IN SUBSTANTIVE PLENARY DEBATE, BUT WE CAN NOT YET  
BE CERTAIN.

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